Seduction Diplomacy - a must read article by former Bosnian Foreign Minister
Muhamed
Sacirbey is a former Bosnian foreign minister and ambassador to the United Nations. His latest article on diplomacy is very thought provoking for many of us who are active in the arena of human rights. It is shared in full below.
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Serial "Peace Conferences" as Pretext to Blunt Confronting War Crimes
@MuhamedSacirbey
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As nationalism may seduce the masses, so may vanity have the same effect
upon individual diplomats engaged in conflict resolution. While some may debate
what strategic interests, conspiracies or prejudices are at play in motivating
policy, too frequently it may be the egos of the personalities involved. During
the conflict(s) in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly Bosnia &
Herzegovina, "BiH", some presumed mediators too frequently wandered
in more as eager "players" in a single's bar, and Slobodan Milosevic
knew how to make himself appear as the most desirable partner. It is perhaps a
lesson and tactic learned by Bashar Assad, Vladimir Putin and other despots
from Myanmar to the Horn of Africa, and a failure of today's as well as
yesterday's diplomacy.
Face of post Berlin Wall Yugoslavia?
Milosevic, the "strongman of Serbia," was being projected as the
face of a new Yugoslavia as Communism was collapsing in Europe. However, his
nationalist rhetoric and demands for effective supremacy with respect to the other
republics in the Yugoslav union including Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia as well
as BiH were at least in part bringing about the disintegration of that
Yugoslavia. In order to perpetuate his hold on power, he had undergone a quick
costume change on stage from communist to nationalist. By early 1992, he had
armed and set loose both regular and para-military forces upon BiH in an effort
to carve out a "Greater Serbia" from lands torn away from neighbors
(including Croatia) via ethnic cleansing/genocide. By UN Security Council
Resolution, Milosevic's Belgrade was ordered to withdraw its military from BiH,
but in fact the killings and ethnic cleansing were perpetuated, even
intensified.
Rather than confront Milosevic, many among the big powers as well as the
UN, sought to suppress the evidence of the war crimes and other grave
violations of international humanitarian law. Once the information began to
leak out of the mass killings and concentration camps in the summer of 1992
primarily from courageous international reporters (as Roy Gutman, Ed Vulliamy
and others) but also from sources within the UN (UNPROFOR) who provided our UN
Embassy with "confidential" direct evidence of first hand reports and
the implicit cover-up, (see my statements in 1992 via The Washington Post
("UN Knew of Serb Camps a Month Ago, Bosnian Says,") the
outcry for intervention was mounting.
Serial "Peace Conferences" as Pretext to Blunt Confronting War Crimes
The call for intervention in BiH though was dampened by a sudden call for
what would become a protracted series of "peace conferences" or more
accurately dalliances with Milosevic. As I learned several years later, then
French President Francois Mitterrand, (who spoke of the Bosnian Muslims as
outsiders in Europe even if they were the indigenous population), called then
UK Prime Minister John Major by phone, (who apparently was fishing in
Scotland), and asked him to urgently convene a conference in London with the
express purpose of dampening calls for US/European/NATO intervention. The so-called
"London Conference," was pulled together in a couple of weeks at the
end of August 1992. It is largely buried in history as such flops generally are
if they evidence a narrative contrary to the big powers that launch them.
However, at the time it ballooned into a grand event but in the end it was more
a coming out ball for Milosevic.
Then Prime Minister Milan Panic sought to impress upon the Conference that
he was the true leader of what remained of "rump-Yugoslavia," but
Milosevic played the coquettish role to perfection. Rather than seek to
sideline Milosevic, global leaders waited their turn for a private dance with
him in the many adjoining chambers of the Conference center. The London
Conference concluded with many promises, and if kept would have delivered not
only an earlier more true peace but also saved lives. Of course, from the
outset, Milosevic had no intention of keeping to his vows of chastity in ending
the aggression upon BiH.
Milosevic, largely successfully, projected himself as the man in charge but
also free of the excesses of nationalism and the crimes committed in its name.
The reality of his two-timing though was obvious to any who would bother to
look beyond the rendezvous' with the despot. Milosevic's Belgrade controlled
the military and logistics that fueled the sieges and killing in BiH. Further,
when speaking in Serbian to the domestic audience he was the convincing
ultra-nationalist, instigator and opportunist.
What made Milosevic the great partner in talks was his willingness to
apparently listen, and particularly feed the craving of his diplomatic guests
to be seen as fitting partners, as well as international recognition and
honors. To enhance the perceived difficulty of the task, the mediators
frequently collaborated in the narrative of "age-old hatreds," and
thus giving credence to the claims and legitimacy of the most brutal as well as
ultra-nationalistic.
As host, Milosevic became known for long sessions of generous servings of
drink and conversation and all making the partners in such feel equal in rank
and role to not only the leader of Serbia but one perceived as the key player
in the region. Of course, a clever mediator might employ the same appeal to the
vanity of some absolute ruler or war lord to gain their ear in the start of
talks. However, it was Milosevic who had them coming back to him, as much to
satisfy their own lust for vanity, in a series of one-night stands.
Each left with little of substance to show but feeling that the next trip
would finally deliver Milosevic's signature and heart - just one more
rendezvous. It continued like this for years, before, and after Dayton at the
end of 1995. Elle King's hit song, "Ex's and Oh's," two decades later
becomes a fitting metaphor.
"One, two, three, they gonna run back to me
'Cause I'm the best baby that they never gotta keep
One, two, three, they gonna run back to me
They always wanna come, but they never wanna leave"
(More at Bottom of Article)
'Cause I'm the best baby that they never gotta keep
One, two, three, they gonna run back to me
They always wanna come, but they never wanna leave"
(More at Bottom of Article)
Seduction & Poker
During the negotiations leading up to and during the Dayton Conference,
Milosevic's hold over the gathered real and wanna-be mediators frequently
played them off against each other. His demands undermined not only shared
American/European values but also Euro-Atlantic strategic interests. A few
years later Ambassador Richard Holbrooke would acknowledge that granting Milosevic's
demand for "Republika Srpska" was a defining mistake. Even though the
final stage of the talks was being held in a US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio
(Wright Brothers AFB), Milosevic still defined the game and the nature of the
desired peace, based on ethnic/nationalist delineation. Milosevic's seductive
appeal made his poker hand look stronger than it was, and as one US official
stated, "we could not afford to call his bluff."
During the serial peace talks that meandered from Geneva, New York,
Brussels, Ankara, Bonn, etc. from 1992 to 1995, frequently I was in the room,
if not always seated at the table. While most others talked of plans and maps,
Milosevic spoke flattery and wounded feelings. However, he was at his best in
small, more intimate settings. The Dayton talks frequently dissolved into
non-formal sessions. On a couple of occasions, Milosevic asked me to "have
a drink with him" or "if I did not drink alcohol, to share a cup of
coffee." I must admit that I was flattered, but not seduced. I diplomatically
rejected. I saw Milosevic not necessarily as the true believer, but as the
master manipulator who had turned Serbian nationalism into something beyond
national pride and into an ethnic cleansing and killing machine. You just don't
jump into bed, regardless of how appealing the flattery and opportunity to be
seen as even more desirable.
Failures in Dayton Accords Plant Seeds for Ukraine, Syria....?
Milosevic's success is frequently associated with the final Dayton Accords.
I resigned as BiH's Foreign Minister toward the end of the talks seeing the
steady erosion, prostitution to Milosevic's demands, of the future of a lasting
peace and functional country. Compromise is not a bad word but Dayton left both
peace and the future in great doubt, compromised if not conceded. The
destabilizing effect is still rolling through and beyond the region and Europe.
Milosevic's greatest trick in Dayton though may have been in convincing some in
Washington and Europe that he was one of the pillars in the future of SE
Europe. The Serbian opposition was thus undermined and the opportunity for true
change evaporated. Ultimately, the illusion of Milosevic was washed away, when
two key US players who were not under his spell, Madeleine Albright, now as
Secretary of State, and General Wes Clark, as NATO Supreme Commander, called
his bluff in Kosovo. For Serbia this was an even bigger loss with not only
Kosovo but Montenegro gone. Unfortunately though, the epidemic of nationalist
conflict and politics that might have been in recession has now gained new
legitimacy and currency, from Moscow and Ukraine to Assad, ISIS, and Syria.
(See: "Construction According to Putin's Model, from Bosnia to Europe?")
The Dayton Accords also did end a war, and open societies as well as
democracy have a more nurturing environment in peace as compared to the evils
that are fertilized by conflict. It is a worthy lesson particularly for Syria,
but diplomacy is not mere words and requires ongoing engagement, before and
after the signatures. (See: "Reckless Diplomacy Disguised as Caution Cost Lives in Srebrenica, &
It's Happening Again, this Time in Syria.)" BiH is now a
weakened state and still needs help in becoming a comprehensive partner in the
Euro-Atlantic family. However, in facing today's challenges, from ISIS to
Putin's resurgent imperial ambitions robed in various fashions of nationalism,
does the US and Europe need BiH even more? (Read: "Can Bosnia's Army Save the World?")
Charisma is a defining attribute for politicians, and former President Bill
Clinton is one leader whose interaction was as effective as any that I have
witnessed - I don't mind admitting that his generous comments in his book and
direct engagement with me did flatter my ego. I remain thankful but not
necessarily spellbound. Seeking the truths about the betrayal of Srebrenica
remains an unshaken desire. Moreover, Bosnians & Herzegovinians still look
to Bill Clinton to help revive the vision and return to Euro-Atlantic values.
(See: "Will Bill Clinton Apologize in Srebrenica?")
The broader lessons go beyond, from peacemaking efforts by UN-mandated
efforts, to emissaries deployed by key capitals. Diplomacy is desirable, but it
can also become subverted by vanity, personal ambitions and seductive despots.
Capable diplomats sent in to confront clever despots could turn out to be akin
to sending the nerdy scholar into a rave party. Presumed intermediaries seeking
a Nobel Peace Prize or exploiting mediation for some ambition for political
office or greater recognition can be as damaging as outright recognition of the
failure of at least this round of engagement. The greatest challenges may come
from within and particularly recognizing when you are being played. There is an
old poker axiom: "If looking around the table and you cannot recognize the
sucker, then it is you!"
@MuhamedSacirbey
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